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ABSTRACT Continuing urbanisation is triggering an increase in multi-titled housing internation-
ally. This trend has given rise to a substantial research interest in the social consequences of higher
density living. Fewer enquiries have been directed to examining how property title subdivisions
generate social issues in multi-titled housing. This is a significant gap in the literature, as the tensions
inherent in multi-title developments have significant implications for individuals, developments and
entire metropolitan areas. This article employs a life cycle framework to examine the profound
operational and governance challenges that are associated with the fusion of private lot ownership
with common property ownership. The article calls for a more explicit recognition of these challenges
by academics, policymakers, practitioners and the broader community.
城市化的 展使得全世界多重所有权的住房不断增加。 一 引 了 高密度居
住之社会影响的研究兴趣。 然而 于多重所有权住房内 权 分造成的社会 ，
研究 少。 是文献中的一个 重空白， 因 多重 权开 中的矛盾 个人、 开
目和整个城市地区都造成 重影响。 本文在生命周期框架内考察私有 权与公共
权交叉所引 的操作和治理 ， 呼吁学者、 决策者、 从 者和更广大的社群关
注 些 。
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common-interest development, strata title
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Introduction
More than half the world’s population lives in cities, a proportion expected to increase to
more than two-thirds by 2050 (DESA, 2010). Multi-unit developments have been built in
cities around the world to house these growing populations. In many countries, these
developments have been subdivided and property titles issued for each unit (Dredge &
Coiacetto, 2011), with units (lots) sold off as freehold properties. A multi-titled
development (scheme) usually comprises privately owned elements (individual lots) and
common property that is owned collectively by lot owners. These ‘dualistic’ systems of
ownership (Lujanen, 2010)1 include condominiums (e.g. USA2), coproprie´te´ (e.g. France),
strata title (e.g. Australia, Singapore), Wohnungseigentum (e.g. Germany), sectional title
(e.g. South Africa) and commonhold (e.g. England). For ease of exposition, hereafter we
use the term ‘multi-title development’ (MTD) to refer to this system of dualistic property
title ownership. This term refers to building subdivisions (in medium and high-rise
buildings) and land subdivisions that incorporate common property (which might include
town houses and freestanding dwellings).
At first glance, MTD is an appealing planning solution to the challenge of creating
privately owned properties in high-density contexts (Churchman, 1999). In theory, MTD
enables intensive residential land use, reducing the need for peri-urban development,
while supporting the establishment of higher order urban services facilitated by economies
of scale resulting from heightened population densities (Randolph, 2006). MTDs also
facilitate private property ownership through the creation of an asset that can serve as
mortgage collateral, and can assist in generating relatively affordable housing options
through efficient land use.
Fusing private lot ownership with common property ownership can, however, lead
to profound operational and governance challenges (Cradduck, 2013). The MTD
model requires careful delineation and collective management of the interests and
rights of individual lot owners and the owners collective. This article identifies and
analyses the challenges associated with the MTD model of ownership. We do this by
drawing on a wide authorship with expertise in the fields of law, planning, sociology
and business. The issues have been structured according to a development’s life cycle,
drawing on the multi-owned development life cycle model developed by Johnston and
Reid (2013).
As the authors are based in Australia, the article focuses on Australia, but the observations
carry considerable pertinence to MTDs internationally and comparisons are made with
international jurisdictions throughout. This international focus brings its own challenges,
as analogous problems in other jurisdictions will manifest as different legal problems
because of the different laws in place governing the development and operation of MTDs,
yet it is impossible to provide an internationally comprehensive account of all MTD
ownership and management systems in a single article. Future research will be needed to
tease out in greater depth the plethora of issues that arise in specific jurisdictions and at
different stages of the property life cycle. This article is therefore intended as a scoping
article, outlining generic challenges arising across the MTD development life cycle.
The article begins with a brief history of the legislative evolution of MTD and a
consideration of the Australian MTD context. This is followed by an examination of:
issues arising in the planning and development phase of MTDs; problems that can arise
when a development transitions from developer to lot owner ownership; concerns arising
290 H. Easthope et al.
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in connection with lot owners collectively managing a scheme; and the challenge of
terminating a MTD. The article concludes with a call to recognise and address the
profound operational and governance challenges that can result from the fusion of private
lot ownership and common property ownership.
Legislative and Policy Context
Arrangements enabling different parts of a single property to be owned by different people
are not new. The concept was recognised in the 1804 Napoleonic “Code Civil” in
addressing disputes over maintenance responsibilities (Article 664, reproduced in Bennett,
2010, p. 251). It was not until after the Second World War, however, that more formalised
arrangements gained greater prominence across the world. Such arrangements include the
German Wohnungseigentum (1951), US Condominium (1961), Australian Strata Title
(1961) and French Coproprie´te´ (1965), amongst others. This occurred in the context of the
growing need to provide housing to those displaced as a result of the war, greater
democratisation and privatisation of property rights, and government efforts to increase
home ownership.
In the latter part of the 20th century, an increasing number of people began to reside in
MTDs around the world as a result of urbanisation pressures, increasing real estate values
and the impacts of urban sprawl. A rich body of research focusing on the influence of
higher density housing on quality of life has developed in the context of urbanisation
policies introduced at this time (for a review, see Gifford, 2007). However, little of this
literature has considered how property title can affect the higher density living experience.
Higher density housing need not be provided as MTDs, and some countries have relied
instead on residential tenancies where residents hold leasehold, rather than freehold
interests in their properties (such as the English leasehold system). However, in many
countries there was pressure for building subdivision to be achieved through multi-
titling. In Australia, this pressure came from two fronts. Firstly, capital lenders promoted
strata titling as it provided a clearer separable asset to be used as mortgage collateral
(elaborated below). Secondly, there is a strong cultural preference for freehold property
ownership and leasehold in residential areas has typically been linked with short-term
associations with land.3
The dualistic nature of MTD property carries different connotations to owning a house on
a plot of land. In Australian strata title developments, for example, although owners purchase
their own property, this is limited to the air space of their lot, or the area inside the centre of
the adjoining lot wall. They also concurrently purchase a joint share in the bricks and
mortar of a scheme and the land on which it sits (i.e. ‘common property’). As Yip and Forrest
(2002, pp. 703–704) explain, while “the idea of home ownership is closely associated with
notions of privacy, freedom, independence and autonomy”, especially in Western contexts,
in reality “many home owners are in circumstances which require collective agreement
and collective action in relation to repairs, maintenance and management”.
In the US context, McKenzie (2003, p. 214) explains, “nothing about common-interest
housing [including condominiums] can be called fully private or fully public”. In MTDs,
the owners corporation (OC—the collective of lot owners in a particular scheme) set and
enforce rules governing behaviour (by-laws), levy contributions and provide services. OCs
also delegate some of their responsibilities to an elected committee, which has authority
to make certain decisions on behalf of the OC. Seen this way, the elected committees
How Property Title Impacts Urban Consolidation 291
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constitute mini-governments. Unlike governments, however, these representatives are
usually untrained and unpaid volunteers. OCs can also be compared to private corporations,
as they are concerned with the market value of their properties. Their shared spaces can be
described as ‘club goods’ (Webster, 2002), where the right to use the space derives from
membership in a club of owners. McKenzie (2003) recognised common-interest housing as
an institution that sits between the three institutional sectors of liberal democratic society—
the market (profit), the state (authority) and civil society (voluntarism).
MTDs are becoming a common form of property ownership in many cities worldwide.
Because the legal structure of MTDs includes the management of common spaces and the
behaviour of residents, MTDs extend the range of private governance in cities and this is
mostly supervised by untrained volunteers. While their actions are subject to government
regulations, it is difficult for legislation to keep pace with the rate of contextual change
pertinent to the MTD sector (Easthope & Randolph, 2009). In the realms of law and
policy, courts and governments are seeking to resolve ensuing conflicts and provide fine-
tuned interpretations for the operation and management of MTDs. The growing size and
complexity of MTDs, associated legal disputes and overwhelmed or inadequate mediation
processes have prompted frequent government enquiries and legislative amendments (e.g.
Armbru¨ster et al., 2010 [Germany]; NSW DFT, 2012 [Australia]). A large and unwieldy
legislative environment has been the consequence in many jurisdictions. Combined with
widespread apathy amongst lot owners with respect to community living rules and
responsibilities (Easthope et al., 2012; Chu et al., 2013), this creates a fertile ground for
dysfunctional MTDs.
MTDs in Australia
This article focuses on a specific jurisdiction, in order to facilitate a closer examination of
key issues arising in MTDs. Australia provides an interesting environment for examination
as it is one of the most urbanised countries in the world (DESA, 2010) and has a MTD
legislative history spanning more than 50 years. There is also relative uniformity between
the Australian states in terms of OC powers, lot owner rights and dispute resolution
provisions that is not mirrored in other jurisdictions such as the USA or UK (Atkinson
et al., 2005; Hyatt & French, 2008; Sherry, 2009b).
Although most Australians live in single detached housing (ABS, 2012), MTDs are the
predominant form of title in significant sectors of the urban property market. For example,
the majority of private residential apartments are strata titled, and the tourist
accommodation sector in Queensland and Western Australia relies heavily on strata
properties (Cassidy & Guilding, 2011). Many master planned estates (gated and non-
gated) are also developed as MTDs. By the end of 2011 there were approximately 277 000
strata and community title schemes that collectively comprised over 1 900 000 lots, mostly
residential or mixed use4 in Australia, and approximately 3 million people (nearly one in
eight Australian residents) lived in a MTD in 2012 (Easthope et al., 2012).
In contrast to many parts of Europe, only a small proportion of Australian dwellings
were apartments prior to the introduction of strata title.5 This is similar to the situation in
the USA, where post-war urban growth through detached suburban houses had been the
norm. Pre-strata apartments in Australia were typified by small walk-up rental properties
(Pickett, 2009), with a single building owner, or subject to ‘company title’ where owners
held shares in the company that owned the building and land (Sherry, 2008). These shares
292 H. Easthope et al.
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are not recorded in land titles’ registers but provide each owner with the right to occupy
their unit. While they provide property rights, they are not rights to land, and a sale or
transfer of a shareholding usually requires approval from the board of directors. In the
event that a mortgagee wishes to exercise a power of sale, they require collective approval
from the board of directors. By contrast, strata title legislation creates a registered title to
land, and prohibits restrictions on transfer, lease or mortgaging of individual lots. The
removal of restrictions over the use of properties, including whether and to whom
properties can be rented or sold, increased their attractiveness to major capital lending
institutions and property investors, and Australian lending institutions began to view
investment in strata developments as equivalent to traditional housing estates.
Urban consolidation policies have also been introduced in Australia, as they have in
many other countries (OECD, 2012). Two-thirds of the Australian population are already
concentrated in the five main cities (Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Brisbane and Adelaide)
which are all subject to metropolitan development strategies that promote urban
consolidation to counter urban sprawl in the face of an increasing population and
demographic change. The projected urban intensification requires the provision of over 1.5
million new dwellings, the equivalent of 16 per cent of all private residential dwellings in
Australia (ABS, 2012), over the next 25–30 years (VIC DPCD, 2008; QLD DIP, 2009;
NSW DOP, 2010; SA DEPLG, 2010; WA DOP, 2010).
Given that MTDs have been embraced as a key enabler of Australian urban
consolidation, one might anticipate that they would operate smoothly. Yet recent evidence
has demonstrated that there is widespread concern amongst MTD lot owners about the
quality of the management and governance in their schemes (Easthope et al., 2012).
Indeed, the low-risk low-cost finance assessment of MTD properties has not reflected their
inherent challenges. As demonstrated in the remainder of this article, these challenges can
manifest at all stages in the life of a MTD scheme.
Stages of theMTD Life Cycle
Stage 1: Planning and Development
By virtue of their titling arrangements, MTDs add a tier of complexity to urban planning
and management (Dredge & Coiacetto, 2011), and potential future issues can be
inadequately considered during planning and development phases. For example, taking a
life cycle perspective on a proposed building falls beyond the scope of a development
assessment, as approvals and conditions are determined by the statutory planning
instruments that apply when the application is made.
Whilst these issues are common to all forms of development, the planning and
development challenge is compounded in MTDs as a result of three inter-related factors.
First, the complexity of titling arrangements complicates the process. Second, the nature of
ownership and property rights in MTDs and the potential for conflicts between multiple
stakeholders render these issues harder to address. Finally, the expertise (or lack thereof) in
identifying and responding to issues that might occur during a building’s life cycle makes it
difficult to identify robust planning solutions that can accommodate future contingencies.
Difficulty in determining who will use the scheme in the short, medium and long term
signifies that many social, environmental and economic factors pertinent to a building’s
design cannot be addressed during the development approval phase. Complexities such as
How Property Title Impacts Urban Consolidation 293
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the governance structure to be adopted in a MTD also require specific legal expertise that
results in increased costs and risks to developers. This highlights an entry barrier to MTDs
that some development companies perceive as insurmountable (Coiacetto, 2006).
Design guidelines. While it is desirable to achieve effective designs that meet the needs
and expectations of residents, this can be difficult and costly. At the individual lot level,
issues such as layout, storage, privacy and ventilation must be considered. At a building
level, issues such as the design of common areas and design to minimise the transmission
of noise and smells between lots are important (Easthope & Judd, 2010).
The complexity of addressing design issues in MTDs is heightened when there is a
broad range of end users involved in a building (e.g. investors, owner-occupiers, tourists,
short-term residential and commercial tenants). The fact that requirements frequently
change over time as a building ages and as its mix of users change, further augments the
design challenge.
Design also carries longer term implications for equipment choice, maintenance and
energy costs. Yet in Australia, the designer and their client (the builder or developer) tend
not to have an ongoing interest in the building once all of the lots have been sold. Thus,
there is little incentive for the developer to give extensive consideration to a building’s full
life cycle (Morrison, 2007).
Allocation of title and responsibilities. MTDs start with the registration of a plan of
subdivision, which creates multiple titles that define individual and collective ownership.
A well-drafted plan requires the collective expertise of surveyors, planners, designers,
architects and lawyers. Disputes often arise if restrictions to ownership and usage rights to
common property (e.g. car parks, lifts and other utility infrastructure) within a scheme are
not adequately reflected by adjusting lot owners’ contributions (e.g. Christudason, 2004;
Goodman & Douglas, 2008). In practice, the integration of building design, subdivision
plans and special service arrangements with equitable contribution schemes and effective
by-laws can be complex, especially for large mixed-use developments (e.g. Cradduck,
2013). Failure to create an overarching, holistic and workable ‘operational plan’ can
condemn eventual MTD owners to years of costly dispute (Easthope et al., 2013a).
Building standards, defects and sub-contractors. Building defects are consistently
identified as a problem both in Australia and internationally (e.g. Christudason, 2007;
Easthope et al., 2012). Rectifying defects can be expensive and collective action
practically and legally difficult to mount, particularly if defects are located in individual
lots as well as common property. In the case of MTDs, owners must first determine whose
responsibility it is to act, as defects on lot property are the responsibility of individual
owners, while defects on common property are the responsibility of OCs. Furthermore, as
discussed below, many Australian developers have found ways to maintain control of an
OC and can use this position to frustrate attempts to initiate legal action in connection with
remedying defects (Sherry, 2009b; Johnston et al., 2012).
Stage 2: Transition to Lot Owner Control
Prior to a MTD registration, the original owner (usually the developer) controls all aspects
of the development. Once the scheme is registered and the OC created, the developer can
294 H. Easthope et al.
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maintain tight control over the development. Until sufficient lots have been sold, the
developer constitutes the OC and can cause it to act in ways that suit its interest. For the
purpose of this article, these two periods (pre- and post-scheme registration) are
collectively referred to as the transition period (i.e. the period covering a MTD’s transition
from developer control to eventual lot owner control). Despite legal obligations and duties
imposed on developers, industry experts continue to raise concerns about developer
practices that negatively impact on schemes (Sherry, 2010).
Setting levies. Prior to the registration of a MTD, the developer determines initial levies.
There appears to be a widespread underestimation of initial levy contributions, in order to
support the marketing of lots off the plan and in the early years of a scheme (Johnston
et al., 2012), and to minimise the costs for the developer during the transition period
(Kleinschmidt, 2011). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the practice is widespread in
Australia, similar to ‘low-balling’ that was evident in the USA during its early 1970s
property boom (Sherry, 2010). The longer levies are held artificially low, the greater the
financial distress eventually encountered by an OC due to an accumulating budget deficit.
This problem can be greatly exacerbated by unexpected events such as the need to finance
building defects rectification and associated legal claims (Easthope et al., 2012), or to
respond to uninsured natural disasters (Guilding et al., 2013).
Negotiating contracts. During the transition period, the developer often enters into
negotiations with service providers on behalf of the OC. Typically, these providers include
a MTD manager, utility providers and in some cases a caretaker (or management rights
business operator6). Although disclosure is required for these long-term arrangements
(which can be locked in for up to 10 or even 25 years), many purchasers do not read
disclosure documents nor understand their significance (Miller et al., 2006).
Additional and often undisclosed arrangements between the developer and service
provider can become a source of conflict. For example, the MTD manager may prepare the
initial scheme budgets and the first annual general meeting (AGM) for the developer at a
discount or no fee. In return, the developer will have the OC enter into an agreement
whereby the MTD manager is contracted to provide administrative services. Although the
MTD manager owes a legal duty to the future OC, in practice, s/he still has an interest in
maintaining a commercial relationship with the developer. Consequently, the MTD
manager may have real or perceived conflicts of interest in a scheme (Easthope et al.,
2012). This might include a manager being reluctant to advise the OC to undertake a
building defect report or failing to take action against a developer for unpaid levies, for
example. Such actions can negatively impact a scheme for many years.
Exclusive use by-laws. All MTDs have a set of formal regulations governing behaviour
known as ‘by-laws’. The developer determines the by-laws for the scheme during the
transition period. Although model by-laws7 are often registered, developers frequently
write their own, including ‘exclusive-use’ by-laws that grant sole use of part of the
common property to specific lots. Some of these may be necessary, however, developers
can incorporate by-laws that benefit the on-site caretaker or lots that the developer has
retained (Johnston et al., 2012). Such by-laws can be a source of tension between different
stakeholders, especially in circumstances where the OC is required to maintain the area out
of common funds while only a sub-set of lot owners can benefit from its use.
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Other developer control. Following registration, the developer is required to hold the first
AGM of the OC8 and to submit a number of documents to the OC.9 Concerns have been
raised about compliance with both the timeframe required for holding the first AGM and
the relinquishment of material documents (Johnston et al., 2012).
Another practice of concern is the attempt to retain proxies or powers of attorney in
contracts of sale, giving the developer the purchaser’s vote on the OC. Although this has
been outlawed in some jurisdictions,10 there are still other means to achieve similar
outcomes. An example is in professionally managed short-term accommodation buildings
where the developer-appointed service provider obtains proxies as part of the letting
arrangement. As a result, the developer can control governance long after power should
have transferred to other owners (Johnston et al., 2012). This situation exemplifies
tensions between the role of MTDs as private, public and civil institutions. Developers can
protect their own financial interest by controlling the quasi-government functions of a
scheme, thereby limiting the impact of other owners as civil actors on the volunteer
committee.
Even where developers do not maintain control of a scheme, many challenges that OCs
and lot owners confront in a MTD can be traced back to the governance and management
arrangements established by developers in the transition period (Easthope et al., 2013a).
Abusive practices in Australia mirror those that have occurred in other jurisdictions
around the world (Blandy et al., 2010).
Stage 3: Operational Life of a Scheme
OCs are overseen by an elected volunteer group of lot owners who often have no
management experience or training (Easthope et al., 2012). Australian evidence suggests
that many people are not aware of their rights and responsibilities as MTD owners, and
owner apathy is rife in many schemes (Goodman & Douglas, 2008; Easthope et al., 2012).
This results in difficulties finding people willing to stand for committees and vote at
meetings. Where volunteers are appointed, a MTD scheme is vulnerable to the vagaries of
the capabilities and motivations of the individuals who offer themselves for service.
A volunteer committee in a large MTD complex will be responsible for the complex
maintenance and safety requirements and overseeing budgets that can run into millions of
dollars. Yet committee members are not subject to the same accountability measures
imposed upon company executives or government officers undertaking similar roles in the
public and private sectors.
In Australia, many OCs engage the services of a professional MTD manager to provide
administrative services (Easthope et al., 2012). A MTD manager’s services typically
encompass collecting levies, preparing budgets, ensuring legislative and taxation
requirements are adhered to, organising annual and special meetings, maintaining records,
administering insurance, preparing financial statements and arranging for an annual audit.
MTD managers can also provide continuity to the management processes in developments
that have a high committee turnover or inactive OCs. MTD managers are in a difficult
situation: they are employed to manage collectively owned private assets (club goods) on
behalf of volunteer committee members, and must do so within the confines of government
legislation. Despite this challenge, in most Australian jurisdictions, there has been no
requirement for formal training for people holding a MTD manager position, and an absence
of any publicised key performance indicators that can be used as a basis for monitoring
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MTD manager performance.11 As such, the professionalism of MTD managers, and
satisfaction of owners with their services, varies considerably (Easthope et al., 2012).
Management of the building and finances. Most Australian jurisdictions structure the
budgeting of OC expenditures around two funds. The ‘administrative fund’ covers
recurrent operational expenditure such as insurance, MTD agents’ fees and service fees (e.
g. water and electricity) for common property areas. The ‘sinking fund’ covers irregular
capital expenditure on common property.
Legislation in Australian jurisdictions requires that levies are raised and collected. Most
Acts, however, are silent or provide discretion when it comes to determining what is an
‘adequate’ reserve. Some owners are also not clear about what levies are being collected
for, leading to dissatisfaction and frustration (Easthope et al., 2012).
While some jurisdictions require the development of a sinking fund plan (budget) and
the maintenance of a sinking fund, there is considerable scope for an OC committee to
influence the extent to which the sinking fund is maintained at a sufficient level and many
sinking funds are under-funded (Easthope et al., 2009). This can cause considerable
tension because owners can be charged a special levy to cover the shortfall of reserves
(Arkcoll et al., 2013). This not only raises practical challenges for those owners who are
unable to pay special levies, but also raises equity issues, with current owners making up
for a shortfall in funds contributed by previous owners.
In addition to budgeting and collecting funds, an important responsibility in the
management of MTDs concerns overseeing expenditure. Determining sinking fund
expenditure priorities can be contentious. For example, the disposable income of owners,
whether they are owner-occupiers or investors, and their household composition will
affect their likelihood of supporting building improvements. These competing priorities
and expectations will manifest when deciding whether, and how, to expend funds. This can
cause delays in the pursuit of repairs, maintenance and building improvements, resulting
in frustration amongst owners and residents (Easthope et al., 2012).
Managing people and relationships. Effective operation of MTDs is also dependent on
managing social relations between stakeholders. MTD residents frequently live in close
proximity, heightening the importance of effective social interaction. However, MTDs
differ from other types of multi-unit properties because owners have no power to approve
or veto lot sales or lettings. This has two important implications. First, it potentially
increases the likelihood of conflicts occurring between different people involved in a
scheme. Second, because people who move into a MTD are generally making the decision
to move into a particular lot, rather than a particular community, it cannot be expected that
they will necessarily wish to establish a close relationship with their neighbours.
Compounding these issues, apartments in Australia have traditionally been considered a
temporary housing option, more attractive to investors than resident owners (Yates, 2001).
Certainly, the proportion of investor ownership of MTD properties is high, with 53 per
cent of strata lots in NSW owned by (non-resident) investor owners, for example (CFRC,
2011). This, coupled with relatively low security of tenure for private rental tenants in
Australia (Hulse et al., 2011), has led to high levels of residential ‘churn’ in MTDs, with
subsequent impacts on community development and governance capacity.
Typical disputes between MTD residents include issues regarding noise, parking,
garbage, and repairs and maintenance. Such disputes often “reflect deeper underlying
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clashes in lifestyles and expectations between residents” (Easthope & Judd, 2010, p. 29).
In mixed-use developments, conflicts can also occur between residential and
commercial tenants, or owner-occupiers and short-term visitors, especially regarding
the use of facilities and responsibility for paying for common property wear and tear
(Guilding et al., 2005).
Disputes also extend to activities in a private lot impacting upon other residents, for
example, intrusion of noise and smells (especially tobacco smoke). Addressing these
problems can be particularly difficult as the solution usually requires a majority decision of
the OC to impose new rules onto an owner to moderate his/her behaviour within his/her
own property.
Ideally, disputes will be addressed through discussion and informal mediation. This
means that the interpersonal skills of residents, owners and committee members are
critical to driving the success of MTD living. In some cases, formalised meetings are
necessary to address disputes, including professional mediation, adjudication, and tribunal
and court hearings. However, formal processes can be time consuming and costly, lead to
unsatisfactory outcomes and carry the potential to overwhelm and intimidate some people,
causing further disharmony (Leshinsky et al., 2012).
As already indicated, ‘by-laws’ are the rules that govern behaviour in a MTD. In most
Australian jurisdictions OCs have the power to make, change and register by-laws which
are subject to few limitations.12 Although Australia has made some legislative decisions
banning certain by-laws (Sherry, 2008), judicial consideration of by-laws is scant and
inconsistent. In particular, unlike the USA (Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes,
2000), Australian legislatures and courts have yet to confront the fact that some by-laws
constitute positive burdens on land (Sherry, 2011). A title to land that is loaded with
obligations and restrictions on use has feudal characteristics that are contrary to modern
expectations of ownership. By providing developers and communities with almost
unlimited freedom to write by-laws, there is a danger that large quantities of housing will
be created with obligations and restrictions that future owners might perceive as a liability.
A special majority or unanimous agreement is needed to change a by-law, which is a much
more onerous process than the creation of the initial by-laws by the developer’s lawyer.
Further, in contrast to the USA, Australian courts have barely begun to grapple with the
danger of by-law changes that strip residents of vested rights (Sherry, 2009a), or infringe
fundamental freedoms, nor have they developed principles to prevent the selective
enforcement of by-laws by OCs (Hyatt & French, 2008).
Although some states have sought to curb improper behaviour by enacting codes of
conduct for committee members (e.g. Queensland, Schedule 1A of the Body Corporate
and Community Management Act 1997), there is still considerable scope for further
delineations across this grey area of conflict between individual and collective property
rights and expectations.
Stage 4: Termination
As stated earlier, it is over half a century since MTD began to be widely adopted as a
development vehicle in Australia. Accordingly, many of the early properties are becoming
obsolete or ineffective in their current condition and location. Redevelopment of ageing
MTDs generally necessitates termination of a scheme as a legal entity. This requires the
unanimous agreement of all owners.13 Alternatively, a court application can be made by an
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owner, mortgagee or the OC for an order to terminate the scheme.14 These onerous
statutory requirements underscore a key challenge of reconciling individual and collective
property rights and place additional restrictions on each lot owner. They cannot act, or in
the case of termination, decide not to act, without affecting others. This is a classic example
of the tragedy of the anti-commons principle, where too many people have legal rights of
veto over land use resulting in land being chronically underdeveloped (Heller, 1997).
Challenges for redevelopment. Termination and re-development of a MTD scheme can
be driven by two key stakeholder groups—the scheme’s owners or external property
developers. If the latter, an interested developer will attempt to purchase all lots in a
scheme. When attempting to purchase the final units, however, the stakes rise at an
accelerating rate and a developer becomes vulnerable to a holdout by a final owner(s)
refusing to sell (Warnken & Guilding, 2014). Such refusal to sell might be seen to simply
reflect the exercise of rights by a private property owner. However, in a MTD there are
multiple private property rights at stake. When a scheme becomes badly run down and
some owners refuse to sell, other owners are condemned to spiralling maintenance costs
and continued uneconomic occupation of the scheme (Warnken & Guilding, 2014).
Further, when older schemes could be redeveloped with greater dwelling density, a single
owner’s ‘holdout’ has the capacity to stymie urban consolidation, thereby affecting the
wider community and the capacity of planners to convert an urban vision into a reality
(Morrison, 2007).
As a response to these pressures, some jurisdictions (e.g. Singapore, Hong Kong and
some states in the USA) have legislated to reduce the voting threshold required to enable a
termination. The United States Uniform Condominium Act (1980), for example, allows the
termination of residential condominiums on agreement of 80 per cent of owners. The
association can then enter into a contract for sale, with agreement of 80 per cent of owners.
This model requires the association to act strictly in the interests of individual owners and
courts will readily enforce this obligation. Similarly, the Singapore collective sale model
allows for the collective sale of all of the units in a development to a single purchaser with
a vote of 80 per cent of owners (for buildings older than 10 years). In Singapore the key to
these changes has been a fair valuation process and ready access to the court system to
address any irregularities (Christudason, 2009).
Concerns around the fairness of any new process. Legislative changes that facilitate
development must be accompanied by carefully designed safeguards against property
speculation and exploitation of individual residents and owners. There is the potential for
property developers to attempt to buy out and terminate schemes in buildings that are
functional but which, due to their location (e.g. waterfront), could support significant
property value gains. A key argument against lowering the vote threshold required for
consent on termination is that it effectively amounts to expropriation of private property.
While there is considerable variation in both constitutional and legislative protection of
private property across jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that expropriation must yield
a community benefit (Gray, 2007). A key question concerns where to draw the boundary
between the rights of individual owners and the interests of the wider community.
Consideration will also need to be given to the issue that large-scale redevelopment of
older properties can result in a reduced supply of low-income rental housing. As Easthope
et al. (2013b, p. 1429) note:
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When owners agree to terminate their strata schemes, tenants will be forced to
relocate. Rundown buildings provide relatively cheap rental accommodation and
when these properties are redeveloped, people may be forced out of the local area,
effectively severing their community ties. The forced eviction of lower income
tenants in an already unaffordable housing market, such as Sydney ... will
undoubtedly increase pressure on government to respond in some way to make up
the affordable housing deficit that could emerge.
Conclusion
Achieving compact cities by increasing population densities is an important objective
internationally. However, Dodson and Gleeson (2007, p. 10) argue that density is a blunt
instrument and that the tools used to procure it may unleash “potentially disruptive and
destructive forces upon urban communities”. This article has highlighted how the
development and management of MTDs can create a series of largely unintended
consequences on the well-being and financial viability of property owners and residents.
We have described how these consequences extend beyond the implications of residential
density for liveability and social cohesion, as they create a broad range of issues that stem
from titling arrangements.
This blunt application of density has resulted from the difficulties faced by planners and
developers in recognising and responding to the challenges of MTDs. The implication is
that future changes to urban development policies should not be restricted to new planning
regimes and planning regulations focused on the built form, but should also incorporate a
review of current models of MTD governance and management. We call upon urban
policymakers and planners to adapt their visions for the future built environment to
recognise the importance of functional, democratically organised developments that
provide the best compromise between individual and collective interests.
Issues addressed in this article suggest that modification of the MTD model is
required to mitigate the tensions and dysfunctions experienced in some schemes.
To this end, the article has initiated a critical, multidisciplinary examination of the
issues and challenges endemic to the MTD model and the profound operational and
governance challenges associated with fusing private lot ownership and common
property ownership.
While the article has focused on the scheme level, the challenges identified have
implications that extend to neighbourhood and metropolitan levels, including the impact
on community cohesion, the quality and safety of the built environment, urban
environmental sustainability, housing affordability (ownership and rental) and the
viability of the property investment market (Dredge & Coiacetto, 2011). Given this
potential for the challenges identified to manifest at a range of urban levels, we must
consider what actions can be taken to mitigate the potential for ‘disruptive and destructive
forces’ stemming from MTDs.
We have painted a dark picture of the problems that can arise in MTDs. However, many
people are highly satisfied with their MTDs (Easthope et al., 2012). Indeed, many of the
identified ‘problems’ of MTD living (e.g. living in close proximity to neighbours and
sharing responsibility for maintenance) can also constitute benefits (e.g. close proximity
living can facilitate positive social relations, and joint responsibility signifies the
avoidance of sole responsibility). With a dedicated volunteer workforce and stakeholders
300 H. Easthope et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
ki
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 L
ib
ra
ry
] a
t 2
2:
43
 2
5 
A
ug
us
t 2
01
4 
capable of collective decision-making, MTD schemes can function extremely well.
Nevertheless, there is significant evidence to suggest this is not universally the case. It is
therefore important to consider what actions can be taken to make the system more
effective for residents and owners.
Such improvement will require the education of key stakeholders with respect to the
nature of MTDs, and their associated challenges. Planners, architects, builders, developers,
government officials, real estate agents, owners, tenants and potential purchasers would
all benefit from an enhanced understanding of the nature and complexity of MTDs.
An improved appreciation of the conflicts that can arise between different stakeholders in a
scheme can assist planners, architects and builders to incorporate designs aimed at avoiding
such conflicts. A better understanding of the tensions that can arise between individual and
collective ownership can assist owners in determining whether their scheme is adequately
financed to undertake necessary building and maintenance works. Acknowledgement of the
tensions in the role of MTD schemes as quasi-governmental, market and civil institutions
can assist prospective purchasers in determining whether the scheme they are considering
acquiring has effective governance and management systems in place. These are just a few
examples of how improved stakeholder understanding could significantly improve the
experiences of MTD owners and residents.
Significant focus has been directed to facilitating increased residential densities, but
much less attention given to ensuring that the ownership model used to deliver such
densification is well designed and consistent with the promotion of well-considered
property rights and residential cohesiveness. In heavily urbanised countries, such as
Australia, there are millions of people living in MTDs that are collectively worth billions
of dollars, yet many professionals and laypeople are ignorant of the challenges inherent to
such developments. This is despite mounting evidence pointing to instances of poor
financial management and poor building maintenance, with serious consequences for the
safety and well-being of residents and owners, and their financial investments. It is
apparent that this is an international phenomenon (Yip et al., 2007; Blandy et al., 2010;
Chu et al., 2013). The growth of MTDs internationally means that these challenges must
be urgently recognised and addressed.
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Notes
1. In contrast to unitary forms of multi-unit ownership, in which individuals own shares in a company that owns
a building, giving them rights to occupy a unit (Lujanen, 2010), and situations in which a single entity owns
the building and individual lots are held on limited leases.
2. The legislation differs in different states in the USA and Australia.
3. While long-term Crown leases are the norm in rural areas of Australia, long-term leases in urban centres are
rare. This is because Australia never had an aristocracy or large institutions with extensive portfolios of
freehold title, which they needed to let out on long-term agreements. In Australia, most urban land is freehold
(Coiacetto, 2014), a pattern that government policy has consistently supported (Freestone, 1989). As a result,
Australians are unaccustomed to long-term leasehold ownership of property, and have a clear cultural
preference for freehold title.
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4. A small proportion have been zoned for industrial and commercial use, but over 80 per cent are designated as
residential or mixed use (Easthope et al., 2012, p. 11).
5. In 1954, only 5 per cent of all private occupied dwellings in Australia were apartments (ABS, 1957). By
1966, this proportion had increased to 11 per cent (ABS, 1971).
6. Management rights are common in Queensland and relatively unique to Australia (Guilding et al., 2005).
7. Model by-laws are generic rules that are provided for in each jurisdiction’s strata legislation. A developer can
choose to rely on the model rules or draft specific rules for a scheme.
8. Schedule 2, SSMA; section 9, CLMA; section 77, BCCM(SM)R; section 75, BCCM(AM)R; section
66, OCA.
9. Schedule 2, SSMA; section 9, CLMA; section 79, BCCM(SM)R; section 77, BCCM(AM)R; section
67, OCA.
10. E.g. NSW: Strata Management Legislation Amendment Act 2008; Victoria: section 89, Owners Corporations
Act 2006.
11. This situation may change, with attempts to introduce national licensing for strata managers in Australia,
accompanied by strata management accreditation, strongly supported by the peak body for the strata sector
Strata Community Australia (Ferguson, 2012; SCA, 2013).
12. An exception is Victoria, where the creation of by-laws is only allowed on a limited range of matters: s138
and Schedule 1, Owners Corporation Act 2006 (Vic).
13. See, for example, Section 78(1) Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld). In NSW,
agreement of all registered mortgagees, lessees and charges must be obtained as well: s51A Strata Schemes
(Freehold Development) Act 1973 (NSW).
14. For example, in Queensland, the District Court has the power to terminate schemes if it is just and equitable,
under s78(2) Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997. In NSW, the Supreme Court has the
power to terminate a scheme under s51 Strata Schemes (Freehold Development) Act 1973.
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